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Many things may obstruct John McCain’s path to the White House, but 
his citizenship status is not among them. The question of his eligibility, 
given the circumstances of his birth, has already been resolved. That out-
come has been produced by actors outside the courts. Judicial validation 
would be at best an afterthought. The episode thus supplies an interesting 
case study in constitutional method. Constitutional questions do not require 
constitutional decisions. If non-judicial actors—including Congress, editori-
alists, leading members of the bar, and the People themselves—manage to 
generate a constitutional consensus, there isn’t much that the courts can do 
about it. In cases such as this one, at least, that seems to be an acceptable 
method of constitutional determination. 
There are two levels to the question of McCain’s eligibility under the 
Article II requirement that the president be a “natural born citizen.” First, 
there is the possibility that the condition restricts eligibility to those born in 
the territory of the United States—in Justice Blackmun’s rather inelegant 
characterization from Rogers v. Bellei, “ ‘Fourteenth Amendment first sen-
tence’ citizens.” Alternatively, “natural born” could also include some or all 
of those to whom citizenship is extended at birth on a statutory, non-
constitutional basis. That would resolve McCain's eligibility as a person 
born in the U.S. Canal Zone to U.S. citizen parents but for an additional 
layer of complication unearthed by Jack Chin. In Why Senator John McCain 
Cannot Be President: Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizen-
ship, Chin persuasively argues that children born to U.S. citizen parents in 
the Zone before 1937 were not granted citizenship at birth. McCain, who 
was born in 1936, did not become a citizen until the following year, with the 
enactment of a statutory fix extending citizenship to any child with a U.S. 
citizen parent born in the Canal Zone at any time after the assumption of 
U.S. control in 1904. With respect to McCain, then, the question is whether 
he qualifies as a natural born citizen even though he was not born a citizen 
at all. 
On the question of restricting presidential eligibility only to those born 
within the territorial United States, most observers now seem to consider it 
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settled that a presidential candidate can qualify as a natural born citizen even 
if born outside the United States proper. As Chin describes, that result has 
support in the English legal tradition and the 1790 statute first extending 
citizenship to the children born abroad to U.S. citizen fathers. But the gene-
sis doesn’t require the result. On the one hand, as Chin points out, even 
naturalized subjects in England were considered “natural born,” which us-
age would read out any meaning from the eligibility condition. On the other 
hand, where those born abroad were deemed “natural born” in the 1790 
statute, the descriptor was dropped from subsequent measures granting citi-
zenship to the children of citizens born abroad, which might imply an 
intention to render them ineligible for the presidency. The most prominent 
episode posing the issue involved George Romney’s run for the White 
House in 1968. Romney was born a U.S. citizen in Chihuahua, Mexico (in 
circumstances rather less dignified than McCain’s—his U.S. citizen parents 
had moved there to practice polygamy). Romney’s eligibility for the presi-
dency was challenged by some on the basis of his foreign birth, but his 
campaign faltered before the emergence of a clear consensus on the matter. 
I. Defining “Natural Born” Outside the Courts 
McCain’s nomination, however, surely confirms that “natural born” citi-
zens can include those extended citizenship at birth by statute in addition to 
those enjoying it under the Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutional actors of 
every description have accepted McCain’s eligibility—bracketing, for a 
moment, the Canal Zone complication. A unanimously adopted resolution 
of the U.S. Senate, co-sponsored by then-leading Democratic candidates 
Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, declares him to be natural born. Editori-
alists of various political stripes support his eligibility. A memo from two 
leading members of the legal-policy elite, Laurence Tribe and Theodore 
Olson—one Democrat, one Republican—reaches the same result. For all the 
venom of this presidential contest, there has been little effort by McCain’s 
opponents—either in the Republican primaries or now in the general elec-
tion—to press the case that, if elected, McCain would be constitutionally 
barred from serving. 
That all adds up to a precedent of constitutional magnitude, even in the 
absence of a judicial pronouncement on the question. There might yet be 
some ambiguity as to the precedent’s contours. Most analyses supporting his 
eligibility highlight the fact that McCain was born to U.S. citizen parents 
stationed abroad on active military duty. As Tribe and Olson conclude, “[i]t 
goes without saying that the Framers did not intend to exclude a person 
from the office of the President simply because he or she was born to U.S. 
citizens serving in the U.S. military outside of the continental United 
States . . . .” The episode might be narrowly construed to establish eligibility 
only in that context, and not in the case of individuals born to civilian 
Americans outside the United States. One can readily construct a justifica-
tion for the distinction, insofar as those born to U.S. service personnel 
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abroad are born in American enclaves that for practical purposes might as 
well be U.S. territory. 
This justification plays, of course, to elide the fact that John McCain 
wasn’t a citizen of any description at birth. Chin’s analysis in that regard is 
compelling as a matter of positive law. And yet his argument shows no signs 
of achieving any traction with salient constitutional actors, some excellent 
media coverage—including a feature piece in the New York Times—
notwithstanding. The Canal Zone twist makes the McCain case even more 
intriguing as constitutional precedent.  
Many prominent jurists and legal scholars have accepted the possibility 
of constitutional custom beyond the Founding era, Justice Frankfurter’s 
“gloss which life has written upon” the words of the Constitution. Accepting 
the possibility of natural born citizens beyond those covered by the Four-
teenth Amendment comfortably fits within this paradigm of constitutional 
interpretation, albeit in a context lacking multiple examples—perhaps ex-
cused by the limiting circumstances of infrequent presidential elections. The 
term “natural born” lends itself to plausible competing readings, one of 
which has been validated by practice.  
But it is another matter altogether to find that practice trumps text. 
Those ascribing constitutional significance to historical practice carefully 
subordinate it to the text; in the interpretive hierarchy, practice is a secon-
dary source. The text supplies a sort of anchor, the absence of which would 
permit unacceptable constitutional drift. This instinct runs deeply in our 
constitutional culture. And yet assuming the validity of Chin’s analysis, the 
episode supplies an example of constitutional desuetude. If McCain was not 
in fact a citizen at birth, it takes some contortion to characterize him as a 
“natural born citizen” under any ordinary meaning of the words themselves. 
Chin’s response is to deplore, in constitutional terms, the prospect of 
McCain’s taking office. “[T]o inaugurate a President in January, 2009 in 
open violation of the Constitution’s terms risks a national trauma,” he 
writes. “It would be a grim moment in history if the very oath to ‘preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution’ that made a person President was also a 
falsehood that defied the document.”  
I doubt things would play out that way. Although some would consider 
McCain’s inauguration a grim moment, it would be for reasons other than 
the circumstances of his birth. It’s unlikely that there would be much more 
than passing reference to the citizenship question in the context of a McCain 
inauguration. That acceptance—especially by actors, such as his Democratic 
opponents, who have incentives to press the challenge—would confirm the 
terms of a constitutional rule on the question. McCain's inauguration in the 
absence of substantial constitutional objection would not be in defiance of 
the Constitution. On the contrary, it would define the Constitution. The epi-
sode would supply an authoritative source for the determination of 
constitutional meaning, circa 2009. The presidential eligibility of those with 
similar citizenship pedigrees would be conclusively established.  
This constitutional determination could well materialize without a pro-
nouncement from the courts. Courts are uncomfortable—if not ill-
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equipped—beyond the realm of positive law, especially when positive law 
and other sources conflict. One might imagine a court affirming McCain’s 
eligibility. But that would pose its own cost, if we assume Chin’s argument 
to be the correct one, for the result would require deforming written law. On 
the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a court finding McCain ineligible. It 
would upset the cart of the political process in too dramatic a fashion; what-
ever the reasoning, the judicial result would surely be thought illegitimate. 
Better to leave the resolution to other actors capable of generating constitu-
tional consensus. 
The consensus on McCain’s eligibility makes sense from any normative 
angle. As Chin himself concedes, the Canal Zone complication is “a techni-
cality ne plus ultra.” No matter how one defines the identity, McCain is 
patently American; there isn’t even a whiff of a competing foreign tie. As 
Tribe and Olson conclude, “Senator McCain is certainly not the hypothetical 
‘Foreigner’ who John Jay and George Washington were concerned might 
usurp the role of Commander in Chief.” Nor would any other person simi-
larly situated. Given that reality, it makes little sense to exact the 
theoretically steep price of the eligibility threshold: depriving the American 
people of a candidate that they would otherwise select as their chief execu-
tive. Assuming the democratic process reflects aggregate preferences, the 
eligibility criterion leads to second-best results. Of course, that is true of all 
eligibility criteria, but with respect to McCain and those like him (in citizen-
ship terms), there is nothing gained by imposing the qualification—or at 
least no intended purpose of the qualification is served by its application. 
II. Extending the McCain Precedent 
So we now know that children born abroad to active duty U.S. military 
personnel, including those born in the Canal Zone before 1937, qualify as 
“natural born” for purposes of presidential eligibility. As noted above, how-
ever, McCain’s case does not supply a necessarily definitive precedent for 
other scenarios implicating the citizenship condition. The Barry Goldwater 
precedent established the eligibility of those born in incorporated territories, 
who were extended citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. That 
probably also evidences the eligibility of individuals born in the unincorpo-
rated territory of Puerto Rico and of Native Americans, to whom birthright 
citizenship extends by statute. 
There are other permutations. Take, for starters, a twist on the birth cir-
cumstances of McCain’s opponent, Barack Obama. If Obama had been born 
in Nairobi instead of Honolulu—not at all implausible, given his family cir-
cumstances—would he be eligible for the presidency? Obama would have 
been born a U.S. citizen under section 301(g) of the Nationality Act, as the 
child of an alien and a citizen who was resident in the United States for a 
period of five years prior to the birth. (Democratic candidate Bill Richard-
son’s life suggests a similar counterfactual. His parents were living in 
Mexico City at the time of his mother’s pregnancy, and he spent his early 
years there, but his father sent his mother to California to deliver him with 
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the intention of securing his citizenship.) The resolution of Obama’s case on 
those facts would be both more and less straightforward. On the one hand, 
the constitutional text would pose less of an obstacle; unlike McCain, 
Obama would have been born a citizen. On the other hand, his birth 
wouldn’t have been in the hyper-American context of an overseas American 
military installation, and the refusal to recognize Obama’s eligibility would 
not risk penalizing military personnel. On balance, Obama’s hypothetical 
case would probably come out the same way as McCain’s, even at a higher 
risk of campaign sloganeering (if only by way of highlighting Obama’s 
cosmopolitan roots). His life story—as with McCain’s, clearly “American” 
in any sense of the word—would sharply cut in favor of establishing eligi-
bility. And with the McCain episode in the history books, the case for 
candidates born abroad as U.S. citizens to U.S. citizen parents would be 
more easily made, insofar as McCain has breached any putative territorial 
parameter. 
To the extent McCain’s case has also breached the temporal barrier, it 
would also help establish the eligibility of foreign-born children adopted by 
U.S. citizens. Under legislation enacted in 2000, these children automati-
cally become U.S. citizens by virtue of their adoption and residence in the 
United States with the adoptive U.S. citizen parent. Many thousands of such 
children acquire citizenship on this basis, and it is not at all hard to imagine 
one of them growing up to launch a credible run at the White House. The 
normative basis for the eligibility of such individuals is strong, although 
they are not citizens by birth. Taken to the United States at a young age and 
raised in citizen families, these individuals should be considered as Ameri-
can as any native born citizen.  
Beyond those cases, extension of the McCain precedent will present 
higher hurdles, and (as in all controversies, in or out of court) particular cir-
cumstances will be crucial. Along the lines of the foreign adopted child, 
there might be room to argue for the eligibility of an individual born outside 
the United States to noncitizen parents who derivatively naturalizes on the 
basis of a parent’s naturalization. When an immigrant parent naturalizes, 
that parent’s children automatically acquire citizenship on a derivative basis 
if they are under eighteen and in the legal and physical custody of the par-
ent. This extension of eligibility would be something of a leap from the case 
of an adopted child, whose citizenship—by virtue of the relationship to the 
adopting parents—can be conceived as relating back to birth, and whose 
arrival in the United States will typically be in infancy (although any 
adopted child under the age of eighteen qualifies under the provision). On 
the other hand, one can imagine the case where the fact of foreign birth as a 
noncitizen seems irrelevant to presidential eligibility, especially where the 
individual came to the United States at an early age. 
All of this points to the possible evisceration of the natural born qualifi-
cation through practice. That prospect might seem far-fetched. Part of the 
challenge here is that presidential elections supply few data points for the 
evolution of practice; there simply aren’t that many people who credibly run 
for president, inhibiting the accretion of constitutional increments on the 
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way to transformed constitutional meanings. But as those born after the ad-
vent of globalization mature, there will be more candidates participating in 
U.S. politics who are something other than native-born citizens. The end-
point of the evolution away from the qualification would be eligibility of all 
naturalized citizens as natural born. There is even a historical hook in Eng-
lish practice—a concededly thin one—on which to hang the conclusion: the 
convention (noted above) under which naturalization itself rendered new 
subjects natural born to the realm.  
Of course, the same result could be accomplished through constitutional 
amendment under Article V, and one could imagine a push to formally re-
move the condition in the face of an overwhelmingly attractive prospective 
candidate for the presidency. But amendment requires such institutional en-
ergy that nothing less would suffice. Recent proposals sponsored by 
Republicans—with an eye to Austrian-born Arnold Schwarzenegger—have 
not made it out of committee, much less out to the States. In the face of leg-
islative inertia, perhaps a politically popular naturalized citizen could simply 
make a run for it. And if the People and other actors fell into line, that would 
be that. 
Conclusion: The Fading Significance of Citizenship 
The significance of citizenship is fading, as well it should. The circum-
stances of birth say nothing about the quality of an individual’s tie to the 
national community. The threats motivating the natural born requirement 
have evaporated. There is no danger of a Trojan-horse candidate usurping 
the presidency and serving the interest of a foreign power. Once considered 
indissoluble, birth allegiance is now easily cast off. Political and security 
processes (in addition to vigorous journalistic vetting) would pick up any 
suspect foreign connections. It is improbable that a major presidential can-
didate would be in a position to do the bidding of foreign actors.  
Indeed, a candidate might conceivably want to flaunt rather than conceal 
a foreign affiliation. Something that’s not prohibited by the Constitution: a 
president holding another citizenship in addition to her citizenship in the 
United States. There is nothing in the Constitution that would bar the dual-
citizen president. Assume an American born in the United States—and thus 
natural born—who subsequently acquires citizenship in, say, Ireland or It-
aly, alternate nationalities that Americans are garnering in large numbers. 
That person would clearly be eligible for the presidency. In the past, a dual-
citizen president would have been a nonstarter as a matter of politics. Today, 
it’s not quite so implausible. Indeed, in the case of the Irish or Italian dual 
citizen, the status might fit comfortably with the tradition of proud ethnic 
affiliation. Nationality is no longer a jealous, exclusive master. It’s an iden-
tity more in line with the many associational attachments that we all collect, 
in infinite combination, some of which are put to political advantage. 
The prospect of a dual-citizen president proves the obsolescence of re-
quiring our chief executives to be natural born citizens. There may well 
SPIRO FTP PAGINATED_C.DOC 9/26/2008 3:47 PM 
48 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 107:42 
 
come a day when the qualification no longer applies. The McCain episode 
supplies an incremental step in that direction.  
